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A DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
Mark D. Linville 
The traditional doctrine of human dignity has fallen on hard times. It is said 
that that doctrine is "speciesist to the core" and "the moral effluvium of a dis-
credited metaphysics." Those of us who would defend the view that humans 
enjoy greater moral standing than nonhuman living things must answer the 
question, "What's so special about humans?" In this paper, I argue that moral 
agency is a great-making property that confers special worth on its bearer. 
I 
Renaissance humanism never had a more enthusiastic spokesperson than 
the young intellectual, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494). 
According to Pico, "Man is the most fortunate creature and thus worthy of 
all admiration." He is "to be envied not only by the beasts, but also by the 
stars, and the Intelligences beyond this world." "To him it was granted to 
have whatever he chooses, to be whatever he wills. "I Pico was seldom 
known for restraint in his intellectual endeavors, and he may have allowed 
himself to get a little carried away. Indeed, Pope Innocent VIII-a human 
himself-suggested that Pico tone things down a bit. What this precocious 
young Florentine professed on paper, a younger Florentine contemporary 
would say just a few years later in marble. Michelangelo'S David also 
bespeaks the dignity and greatness of man. Those were the days. 
Humanism has come in for a great deal of criticism in these twilight 
hours of the twentieth century. In the view of some writers, Pico's praise 
for his fellow humans is the moral equivalent of the white supremacist's 
celebration of his fellow Caucasoids. In particular, environmentalists and 
animalliberationists have been keen to point out that such favoritism for 
those of one's own species is, at best, unjustified and probably just down-
right immoral. James Rachels regards the traditional doctrine of human 
dignity as "the moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics."2 Worse, 
that doctrine is "speciesist to the core."3 One earns the designation 
speciesist in the event that one bebeves that membership in one's own 
species is sufficient justification for preferential treatment of conspecifics. 
Peter Singer, James Rachels, Tom Regan, Paul Taylor and a host of other 
contemporary writers have variously argued that there is no objective cri-
terion in virtue of which we may assign humans a greater worth than their 
nonhuman neighbors. In short: we humans are nothing special! 
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Indeed, some have come to view the human species as a kind of blight 
upon the earth. Consider Edward Abbey's well-known quip that he 
would "sooner shoot a man than a snake."s And the Church of Euthanasia 
offers this counsel: "Save the planet: Kill yourself." Rigor mortis is the car-
dinal virtue to be cultivated according to the teachings of this sect. 
Immediate sainthood awaits any devotee who is willing to become cardi-
nally virtuous and thus help to decrease the surplus population.6 Paul 
Taylor suggests that, while we most certainly need our natural environ-
ment, it has no need of us. In fact, he muses that, were homo sapiens to go 
the way of the dodo, our fellow creatures would likely greet this event 
"with a hearty 'Good riddance!"'7 
II 
My present aim is to defend the traditional doctrine of human dignity, 
which I understand as the belief that humans enjoy a special worth and 
moral standings that is unequaled by the rest of the natural order. I shall 
argue that there are certain uniquely human characteristics or properties in 
virtue of which humans may be said to possess a greater worth than that of 
nonhuman earthly creatures.9 
Of course, the claim that humans possess special value-conferring prop-
erties is nothing new. For instance, Aristotle observed that it is our ratio-
nality that makes us unique, and the Western tradition has been something 
like a footnote to Aristotle in taking this uniqueness to imply special stand-
ing. Or, alternatively, consider Thomas Huxley's reason for denying that 
Darwin's theory undermined the doctrine of human dignity. 
Our reverence for the nobility of manhood will not be lessened by the 
knowledge that Man is, in substance and structure, one with the 
brutes; for he alone possesses the marvelous endowment of intelligible 
and rational speech, whereby, in the secular period of his existence, he 
has slowly accumulated and organised the experience which is almost 
wholly lost with the cessation of every individual life in other animals; 
so that, now, he stands raised upon it as a mountain top, far above the 
level of his humble fellows, and transfigured from his grosser nature 
by reflecting, here and there, a ray from the infinite source of truth. IO 
More recently, Daniel Dennett at least hints in this direction. On the one 
hand, persons are merely primates that have come to be "infested" with 
"memes"-Richard Dawkins' name for any unit of cultural evolution. But on 
the other hand, he insists that "there is a huge difference between our minds 
and the minds of other species, a gulf wide enough to make even a moral 
difference. "II 
Beyond traditional appeals to human intelligence and linguistic capaci-
ties, there is the claim that man alone has the capacity to understand and 
act upon moral principle and that this is the basis of human dignity. If the 
immensity of the starry heavens above me seems to diminish my worth 
and significance, the moral law within me has the reverse effect. The 
Kantian doctrine of human dignity is rooted in human moral agencyY 
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Those critical of the humanistic tradition sometimes observe that 
humans are not, in fact, the only creatures who enjoy rational, linguistic or 
moral capacities. Chimpanzees use tools, gorillas learn sign language and 
elephants weep, we are told. Others challenge the assumption that such 
differences are of any moral relevance. Peter Singer considers such appeals 
in the context of racism. Consider the white supremacist who maintains 
that the average Caucasian has an I.Q. higher than that of the average 
Mrican American, and that this difference justifies differential treatment. 
What should be the main line of defense from people of good will? Should 
we argue that no such differences exist and trust that the best empirical 
studies will bear us out? Singer thinks not. 
Fortunately there is no need to pin the case for equality to one partic-
ular outcome of a scientific investigation. The appropriate response 
to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically based dif-
ferences in ability among the races or between the sexes is not to stick 
to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever 
evidence to the contrary may turn up; instead we should make it 
quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, 
moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality 
is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. . .. The principle of the equality 
of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equali~ among 
humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings) 
Of course, Singer is out to apply the principle of equality interspecifically, 
and so he draws on the support of the imperishable Jeremy Bentham: "The 
question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?"14 
Not just any difference counts as a morally relevant difference. 
III 
It is along similar lines that Paul Taylor argues for the irrelevance of all 
such human singularities. His argument poses a direct challenge to the 
thesis of this paper, and so the following discussion will devote consider-
able attention to that challenge and seek to formulate a reply. 
Taylor considers a number of unique human characteristics, such as 
rationality and autonomy, as the grounds for supposing that humans are 
of greater value than nonhumans. Taylor responds to such suggestions 
with a general question: "Valuable to whom and for what reason?"15 As he 
observes, the characteristics that are typically suggested are certainly of 
great value, but it is a relative value. That is, these uniquely human charac-
teristics may well be of supreme value to humans because they serve as effi-
cient means to uniquely human ends. But other species excel at other 
things. Consider the flight of the falcon or the tree-climbing capabilities of 
the monkey. It is certainly true that monkeys have no great aptitude for 
mathematics. But I have yet to meet a monkey who was concerned to cor-
rect this deficit. And few mathematicians are particularly keen at arboreal 
acrobatics. Each has his forte. Why suppose that either area of competence 
renders the one superior to the other? As Taylor sees it, all such arguments 
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are guilty of special pleading. 
To use only standards based on the good of humans is already to 
commit oneself to holding that the good of humans counts more 
than, or is more worthy of consideration than, the good of nonhu-
mans, which is the point in question. In 
Taylor thus offers a species-relative theory of value that resembles more 
familiar varieties of relativism in interesting ways. The cultural relativist 
insists that there can be no valid cross-cultural moral judgments precisely 
because there is no culture-neutral standpoint from which one might judge 
that some cultures are morally preferable to others. The various cultures 
are "traveling along different roads in pursuit of different ends, and these 
ends and these means in one society cannot be judged in terms of those of 
another society, because essentially they are incommensurable."!7 
Similarly, Taylor asks, "From what point of view are they [human charac-
teristics] judged to be signs of superiority, and on what grounds?" To 
judge that people are better than penguins because we can reason and they 
cannot is to appeal to a criterion that has no valid application beyond the 
boundaries of our own species. Penguin ends and penguin means are sim-
ply different from the ends and means of people. Penguins cannot play 
chess or build cathedrals. But this observation tells us little more than that 
penguins are not people. So what else is new? 
This pattern of argument characterizes Taylor's critique of the tradi-
tional mainstream defenses of humanism. Consider the Aristotelian tra-
dition mentioned earlier, which maintains that humans are essentially 
rational animals and that it is in virtue of their rationality that they are 
set apart from the brutes. Taylor replies, "Even if we were to accept this 
essentialist conception of human nature and human well-being, nothing 
follows from it concerning other organisms."'8 Given this conception 
of human nature, we may well appeal to rationality as a criterion for 
determining whether any individual human is a good of its kind, but 
nothing follows about the relative values or moral standing of humans 
and nonhumans. We may be able to say with Mill that it is indeed better 
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, but we have not found 
here the resources for going on with him to say that it is better to be a 
human than a pig.!9 
The challenge, then, is to discover some property that is uniquely 
human and qualifies its bearer for greater moral standing than those who 
lack it. Let us call such a property a great- making property. Taylor has 
observed that two resembling properties are sometimes confused, and that 
this confusion is at the root of historical and influential defenses of human-
ism. Let us distinguish great-making properties from what I shall call 
excellence properties.20 
(EP) S has an excellence property if and only if S is a member of 
kind K and S has a property P such that for all x and all y, if x 
and yare members of K, and x has P and y lacks P, then x is 
a better instance of K than is y. 
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(GMP) S has a great-making property if and only if S possess a 
property P such that for all x and y, if x has P and y lacks P, 
then x is greater (of greater value) than y. 
Taylor has maintained, in effect, that the only good sense that can be made 
of the "is better than" clause in (GMP) is one that is kind-specific-as we 
have in (EP).2! And so every meaningful instance of (GMP) may be trans-
lated without remainder into some instance of (EP). The fact that, say, 
Calvin admirably meets the criterion set at (EP) gives us no grounds for 
preferring him over Hobbes, who may meet that criterion equally well 
after his kind. 22 
It appears that Taylor is in the business of ruling out apriori the very pos-
sibility of there being genuine great-making properties as we understand 
them. And this seems to be from the very nature of the case. A property 
will not be a plausible candidate for conferring human superiority unless it 
is possessed solely by humans. But Taylor's logic turns that very unique-
ness against the humanist: other creatures do not have the property (or do 
not have it to the degree that humans do) and therefore do not need or 
value it. It is thus valuable only from a human perspective, and so the 
humanist assumes precisely what she attempts to prove. 
IV 
How shall we reply to Taylor'S argument? We might begin by observ-
ing that, interestingly, if it is effective in ruling out human superiority, it 
would seem to work equally well at persuading God to walk humbly with 
himself. For whatever divine attributes were once thought to be great-
making properties (logically maximal power, knowledge and goodness, 
for example) may well be necessary for God to be God, but we humans 
seem to get on quite well without them. Deep gratitude to God may be 
appropriate, but insofar as the worship of God entails ascribing exclusive 
worth to Him,23 God is simply out of line if he demands our worship. 
Indeed, sparrows that are sold two for a farthing, do not need divine attrib-
utes any more than they need any uniquely human characteristics. We 
would thus be mistaken if we supposed that God is of more value than 
sparrows. Many of us, believers and unbelievers alike, think it reasonable 
to believe that if there is a being such as God then he is deserving of our 
worship. Taylor'S argument seems to have the effect of showing that the 
otherwise coherent concept of worship is, in fact, incoherent. While it may 
be true that one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens, 
one might take this result as a sign that Taylor hath proven too much.24 
And one might wonder whether human rationality is valuable only 
from a human perspective, as Taylor maintains. As we have seen, he has 
suggested on several occasions that we look at things from the perspective 
of non-human living things. This is to have the effect of showing us the 
merely relative value of things human. Thus, in reply to the cartesian 
argument that only humans possess minds, Taylor observes that bears 
don't need minds.25 But a mind can be a very handy thing when battling 
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blazes to save bears. I suspect that if bears did have minds they would 
agree26• And if, say, a pair of antediluvian penguins could think and 
speak, they might have thanked their lucky stars that the earth included a 
creature with the rational wherewithal to follow a blueprint. 
Further, and closer to the point of this essay, even if we were to grant 
that individual human characteristics and capacities such as rationality and 
autonomy are not, by themselves, great-making, one might yet go on to 
argue that such properties are essential components of a more complex 
great-making property. Consider human moral agency. Arguably, all 
moral agents are rational and autonomous. And so a successful argument 
establishing that moral agency is a great-making property will affect our 
assessment of these properties as well.27 
Is there a successful argument from moral agency? As I indicated earli-
er, one traditional argument for human superiority is grounded in the 
observation that humans appear to be the only moral agents who grace the 
planet. It is on this point that the author of the Critique of Pure Reason came 
as close as ever to poetic expression. 
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration 
and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry 
heavens above me and the moral law within me. . .. The former 
view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my 
importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet 
(a mere speck of the universe) the matter from which it came, the 
matter which is for a little time provided with vital force, we know 
not how. The latter, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as 
that of an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law 
reveals a life independent of all animality and even of the whole 
world of sense .... 2B 
The clear implication of Kant's remarks is that, but for the moral law within, 
our importance would be annihilated by the sheer immensity of the cosmos. 
We have no good reason to suppose that our fellow earthly creatures also 
carry the moral law within them. And so, while our own worth is infinitely 
raised, they would appear to be, shall we say, "axiologically challenged." 
Kant thus seemed to believe that moral agency is a great-making property 
in the sense that we have specified. 
We have yet to consider Taylor'S reply to the argument for human superi-
ority from moral agency. Though we might expect that his remarks concern-
ing the merely instrumental and relative value of rationality and language 
apply with equal force to moral agency, this is not the case. When Taylor 
turns to the sort of tradition that is represented by Kant's famous passage, he 
adopts an entirely different strategy. He takes that tradition to be asserting 
that "we humans are morally superior beings because we possess, while ani-
mals and plants lack, the capacities that give us the status of moral agents."29 
Rather than argue for the relative value of human moral agency, Taylor 
charges that this argument rests on a fundamental confusion. 
There is a serious confusion of thought in this line of reasoning if the 
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conclusion drawn is understood as asserting that humans are moral-
ly superior to nonhumans. One cannot validly argue that humans 
are morally superior beings on the ground that they possess, while 
others lack, the capacities of a moral agent. The reason is that, as far 
as moral standards are concerned, only beings that have the capaci-
ties of a moral agent can meaningfully be said to be either morally 
good or morally bad. Only moral agents can be judged to be morally 
better or worse than others, and the others in question must be moral 
agents themselves.30 
Suppose, then, that we refer to the view under consideration as the belief 
in human moral superiority and allow that it may be represented as fol-
lows: 
(MS) Humans are morally superior to nonhumans. 
Taylor reads (MS) as having the following import: 
(MSl) Humans are the "moral betters" of nonhumans 
where "x is the moral better of y" means, roughly, "x is more virtuous than 
y." Taylor is certainly correct in observing that, on this reading, it is not 
quite correct to say that (MS) is false. Rather, it is just woefully confused. 
We might as well point out that Porsches accelerate faster than pianos and 
that alligators are fiercer than artichokes. The obvious point in all of this is 
that, in each comparison, a kind of category mistake is committed. Pianos 
and artichokes are neither fierce nor fast because they are not the kinds of 
things to which we can meaningfully ascribe these predicates. 
But (MSl) is neither a plausible nor a natural reading of (MS). Taylor 
himself states the traditional argument for human moral superiority: "Such 
capacities as free will, accountability, deliberation and practical reason, it is 
said, endow us with the special nobility and dignity that belong only to 
responsible beings."3! The claim that humans are "morally superior to 
nonhumans" is simply an awkward wa~2 of saying that our moral capaci-
ties amount to great- making properties, and this is best expressed along 
the following lines. 
(MS2) Individuals with moral capacities are of greater inherent 
worth than individuals lacking such capacities. 
It is somewhat puzzling that Taylor should choose this way of criticizing 
the traditional argument from moral agency because, in addition to stating 
the view in a way that is best represented by (MS2), he interacts with a con-
temporary author who clearly argues for that proposition.33 But it seems to 
me that Taylor has splendid reasons for not attempting to dismiss the value 
of moral agency by means of the relativity argument that we have consid-
ered above. For this would be to maintain that morality and moral capaci-
ties, like rational and linguistic capacities, are of merely instrumental value as 
they serve uniquely human interests. On such a view, moral values are 
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subordinated to non-moral values, and morality becomes a system of hypo-
thetical imperatives: rules telling us what we must do in order to accom-
plish certain ends that we happen to hold, as individuals or as a species. 
It is no mere coincidence that Kant identified t·wo sorts of things that 
have dignity rather than a mere price: human persons and the moral law 
itself.34 Kant saw that genuine respect for persons requires respect for the 
law. My respecting you calls for my acting for the sake of certain direct 
duties to you. I should respect you because it is the right thing to do; and it 
is the right thing to do because you are deserving of respect. If, however, 
my fair treatment of you is only a happy by-product of my looking after 
my own interests or seeking my own ends, then I am merely acting in 
accordance with those duties owed you. This is to behave as though I 
have, at best, certain duties regarding you, and such behavior hardly quali-
fies as respect. It seems to me that these observations apply in the present 
context. If our moral nature has merely instrumental value, in that it 
serves uniquely human ends, then human moral behavior is not directed 
to nonhuman individuals as ends-in-themselves. Neither Taylor nor any-
one who challenges the doctrine of human dignity on moral grounds is in a 
position to limit the significance of human morality to human ends and 
human interactions, for the very project of contending for the equal stand-
ing and value of nonhuman life is a moral one. In sum, if human morality 
is of merely relative and instrumental value from a human standpoint, 
then any acceptable environmental ethic will be an ethic grounded in a 
kind of enlightened anthropocentrism: if ethics is a means to human ends 
then so is environmental ethics. It seems, then, that Taylor himself offers 
us a theory that requires the dignity or inherent worth of morality itself.35 
v 
Consider again our revised statement of the thesis of human moral 
superiority: 
(MS2) Individuals with moral capacities are of greater inherent 
worth than individuals lacking such capacities. 
In the spirit of Taylor'S discussion we may ask "From what point of view 
are moral agents judged to be of greater worth?" Taylor's discussion has 
served to sharpen our focus so that we now know precisely what it is that 
is needed: a uniquely human property that is not merely an excellence prop-
erty but is also great-making. And if there are any great-making properties 
then there is an impartial-indeed, an all-encompassing-point of view 
from which they are so highly esteemed. 
Further, the resulting value must not be merely instrumental since we 
have no reason to suppose that instrumental value is sufficient for estab-
lishing inherent worth.36 Thus, it will not be enough to point out that moral 
agency is valuable to someone or something for some purpose. We seek 
grounds for making the claim that it is a good thing that there are moral agents 
in such a way that it is not reducible to a description of the evaluative pref-
erences of some individual or group in the way that it is a good thing that 
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there are chocolate chip cookies is reducible to a description of my own prefer-
ences. What point of view might provide us with such grounds if it is not 
that of humans, bears or penguins? How about the moral point of view? 
To see this, suppose we restate the claim made at (MS2) in terms of the 
relative values of possible worlds. And let us think of great-making proper-
ties from a slightly different perspective. A property is great-making if it is 
world-enhancing. And a property is world- enhancing if a world in which it 
is instantiated is, all other things being equal, that much the richer. Thus, 
our claim at (MS2) may be expressed as the following: 
(MS3) For any two possible worlds wand w*, if w includes moral 
agents and w* lacks moral agents, then, all other things being 
equal, w is of greater value than w*. 
(MS3) maintains that moral agency is a world-enhancing property. 
Of course, (MS3) is no more impressive than (MS2). But imagine God 
deliberating over which world he will make actual. Presumably, some 
worlds will be more worthy of God's election than others. Consider two of 
God's options. In WI, God creates the heavens and the earth. The light is 
separated from the darkness. The earth brings forth vegetation. But the 
story of creation ends somewhere around verse 13. When trees fall in the 
forests of WI there is no one there to hear them. And, alas, the ocean 
waves of WI are forever unridden. But among the propositions included 
in W2 are all of those represented in the entire first chapter of Genesis. W2 
includes moral agents with the ability to choose for good or ill. The sug-
gestion under consideration is that, all other things being equal, W2 is 
more worthy of God's choice than Wl. 
This may appear to be an instance of special pleading of the worst kind. 
One may be tempted to suggest, politely or otherwise, that the God of this 
story bears the imago hominis. That is, the suspicion may be that we have 
merely projected our own human-centered prejudices into the heavens and 
accorded them divine sanction. But in asking which worlds are worthy of 
God's choice, we are asking which worlds would likely be chosen by a being 
of the nature that God has traditionally been thought to have. And it is pri-
marily God's moral nature that we have in mind in raising this question. The 
suggestion is that in virtue of his capacity as a perfectly good being, some 
worlds are more worthy of election than others. In this way, at least for pre-
sent purposes, we might think of God as morality personified. We are ask-
ing, therefore, which worlds are better given the moral point of view. 
Why suppose that moral agency is a world-enhancing property? Why 
think that a world with moral agents is of any greater value than one with-
out? I suggest that this is because there is a necessary connection between 
moral agency and moral values. With this in mind, one might urge the 
claim that worlds without moral agents are equally impoverished with 
respect to moral values. On this view, worlds that include nothing but, say, 
penguins or elm trees or washing machines are morally neutral. There is a 
range of core moral values that are impossible to attain without the pres-
ence of moral agents. A world inhabited only by penguins or elm trees is a 
world that excludes moral goodness (or evil), rightness (or wrongness) or 
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any of the virtues or vices. This consideration arises in the context of certain 
theodicies in which it is argued that genuine moral agency is a necessary 
condition of a world's producing moral goodness. The suggestion in that 
context, of course, is that that same moral agency has also made possible a 
great deal of moral evil. The backbone of this theodicy is found in the claim 
that it was good-morally good- of God to have created a world capable of 
producing moral goodness or creatures of good will. 
We have identified the moral point of view as the standpoint from 
which to judge the relative worth of beings. There are, to be sure, other 
perspectives from which one may proffer value judgments. For example, I 
happen to think that bald eagles are more beautiful than bald heads so that 
the former are of greater aesthetic value than the latter. Further, some 
philosophers have maintained that beauty has inherent worth.37 If they are 
right, then we must allow that not all judgments of inherent worth are 
made from the moral point of view. But, even if there are valid nonmoral 
judgments of inherent worth, the moral point of view is presupposed in 
the present discussion. It is precisely from the moral standpoint that the 
doctrine of human dignity is either challenged or defended. To observe 
that, say, stunning plumage is of greater value than moral agency from an 
aesthetic point of view is just to imply that some birds are more beautiful 
than moral agents. But I do not deny this. That the hummingbirds in my 
back yard are more interesting to look at than the sleeping student in the 
back row of my classroom is perfectly consistent with the latter enjoying 
greater moral standing than the former. The insights of the aesthetic point 
of view do not, of themselves, challenge the argument of this paper. To 
maintain that objects of beauty deserve moral standing that is equal to or 
greater than that enjoyed by moral agents would indeed propose a chal-
lenge. But it would be a challenge that is urged from the moral, rather than 
the aesthetic, point of view. In order for a challenge to the present argu-
ment to be a challenge, it must maintain that I am mistaken in claiming that 
the moral point of view favors moral agency. 
At any rate, Taylor himself maintains that the concept of inherent worth 
is a moral one with practical moral consequences. 
The assertion that an entity has inherent worth is here to be under-
stood as entailing two moral judgments: (1) that the entity is deserv-
ing of moral concern and consideration, or, in other words, that it is 
to be regarded as a moral subject, and (2) that all moral agents have a 
prima facie duty to promote or preserve the entity's good as an end 
in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is.38 
Given this understanding of inherent worth, it seems that the attempt to 
determine whether some uniquely human characteristic is of supreme 
instrumental value-as a means to achieving some non-moral end-is 
wrongheaded. When the humanist asserts that rationality, autonomy or 
moral agency are great-making properties, Taylor'S question, "Valuable to 
whom and for what reason?" proves to be a red herring.39 Taylor'S own 
view trades on the moral concept of inherent worth, of which he believes 
all organisms to enjoy an equal degree. If the very concept of (moral) 
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inherent worth is coherent, then there is an impartial moral standpoint 
from which that worth may be discerned. The humanist's claim is that 
humans are more valuable simpliciter, and it seems to me that this is best 
captured by the moral judgment that the world is simply a better place if it 
includes moral agents.40 
Atlanta Christian College 
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